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Comparative evolutionary approach to pain perception in fishes 







Abstract: Arguments against the fact that fish feel pain repeatedly appear even in the face of 
growing evidence that they do. The standards used to judge pain perception keep moving as 
the hurdles are repeatedly cleared by novel research findings. There is undoubtedly a vested 
commercial interest in proving that fish do not feel pain, so the topic has a half-life well past 
its due date. Key (2016) reiterates previous perspectives on this topic characterised by a 
black-or-white view that is based on the proposed role of the human cortex in pain 
perception. I argue that this is incongruent with our understanding of evolutionary processes.  
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The question of whether teleost fish feel pain in a manner similar to humans is still hotly 
debated. The answer to this question has big implications not just for fish welfare, but also 
for the fishing and aquaculture industries. For this reason, the debate is often politicised. 
However, good science should not be directed or distracted by political interests.  
 
In his target article on fish pain in Animal Sentience, Key (2016) lays out an argument as to 
why he believes fish do not feel pain – an argument very much along the lines of previous 
papers by Rose et al. (2014). Key approaches the question from a purely mechanistic 
perspective, relying on knowledge of the neuroanatomical structures that are believed to be 
responsible for pain perception in humans. His argument, however, is based on the 
assumption that all animals must process pain in the same way humans do if they are to 
experience pain in a similar fashion; most of the large body of comparative work showing 
functionally analogous and homologous structures across the broader vertebrate phylogeny 
is ignored. Evolution repeatedly throws up examples of convergent evolution in brain 
structure and function. Key’s perspective is black or white: one must be conscious to feel 
pain, which is (arguably) a cortical process in humans. Thus any animal that does not have a 
cortex cannot feel pain. This perspective is inconsistent with the broader view of 
evolutionary processes that emphasises the spectrum of responses as traits evolve through 
common descent. Differences in mental faculties between vertebrate animals tend to be 
differences in degree rather than kind (Darwin 1859). 
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In contrast, Sneddon et al. (2015) and I (Brown 2015) have argued from a behavioural 
ecology perspective that pain perception in vertebrate taxa is likely to have been an ancient 
evolutionary trait given the obvious fitness benefits it conveys to all animals. In this view the 
mechanical detection of noxious stimuli (nociception) cannot be usefully disentangled from 
the emotional (conscious) response to painful stimuli (pain). I do not disagree that fishes, like 
all vertebrates, have rapid, reflexive responses to potentially dangerous stimuli. These 
reflexes serve to immediately withdraw tissues and prevent further harm. However, the vast 
majority of animals also learn to associate painful stimuli with specific contexts or objects 
and therein lies the true value of pain perception. In learning these associations, animals can 
avoid dangerous objects or places in the future with all the obvious benefits that this entails. 
Thus animals must be cognitively engaged with pain perception if the long-term fitness 
benefits are to be realised. 
 
Key seems to believe that the reason the broader scientific community accepts that fish feel 
pain is that it is more benevolent to do so. However, this position misses the fundamental 
argument for fish feeling pain, which is founded in part on the conservative nature of 
vertebrate evolution. If the rest of the vertebrates feel pain, then the most parsimonious 
hypothesis is that they do so because pain evolved deep in the evolutionary history of 
vertebrates (perhaps even before teleosts). Rather than to suppose that pain spontaneously 
arose somewhere else in the vertebrate lineage (e.g., between amphibians and reptiles), it is 
more parsimonious to infer that fish feel pain for the same reasons the rest of the 
vertebrates do. (By the way, from a phylogenetic perspective, all tetrapods are bony fishes!) 
Thus the emphasis of scientific investigation should be on proving that fish do not feel pain 
and coming up with a plausible evolutionary explanation for this lack. Until that is proven 
beyond doubt, our null position should be that fish do feel pain. Key himself concedes that 
we cannot “definitively prove” that fish do not feel pain. This fact is not mitigated by the 
further fact that it calls for a more humane treatment of animals, one that also happens to 
be more congruent with our “benevolent nature.”  
 
Key puts forward a typical human-centric argument focusing on the human pain structures 
and essentially argues that no such structures exist in fishes and thus fishes are incapable of 
feeling pain in the same way as humans. I hasten to add that this would apply to most 
vertebrates, not just fishes. This argument fails for three reasons: (1) it ignores mounting 
scientific evidence of homologous and analogous structures in the fish central nervous 
system including the brain; (2) it ignores the fact that the evolution of the vertebrate brain 
has repeatedly shown evidence of novel structures taking on ancient functions; and (3) 
according to the case studies Key supplies, human subjects with only residual traces of 
cortex still respond to pain on an emotional level. Thus, assuming that the human cerebral 
cortex is the magic bullet of pain perception in humans does not imply that all animals have 
to have a cortex to feel pain. The cortex has similarly taken on many other sensory 
perceptual functions that in other taxa had taken place in other parts of the brain. Pain 
perception in humans is not restricted to the cortex; rather, it is a whole brain function more 
reminiscent of the modern, extended neural network models of neural processing than local 
modular models (van den Heuval & Sporns 2013).  
 
There is some evidence that the signatures of pain can be detected in specific regions of the 
human cortex, but it does not follow that homologous regions do not exist in other animals. 
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It is quite clear that even vestigial residue of cortical tissues is sufficient to subserve an 
emotional response to pain in human subjects; this strongly suggests that cortex-like tissues 
in other animals could perform a similar function. Despite years of intensive research, 
exactly how the human brain responds to pain is still open to debate and to date there is no 
widely accepted method of quantifying pain perception in humans let alone in other animals. 
 
Key points to evidence in rodent models suggestive of structures analogous to the human 
cortical areas that are active during pain perception (Thompson & Bushnell 2012). He 
interprets this as evidence that the cortex plays a role in pain perception in all vertebrates. 
However, rodents are mammals and are thus very closely related to humans. Based on this 
data, one might plausibly extend the hypothesis that the cortex is involved in pain 
perception to encompass all mammals (this still remains to be tested), but certainly not the 
vast majority of the vertebrate phylogeny. One might begin to address this issue 
constructively by looking for analogous or homologous structures in other vertebrates that 
have similar neural architecture. This is the approach that Key himself advocates, but for 
some reason he restricts himself almost entirely to data from humans and rats. His 
treatment of the fish literature is selective at best, and we hear very little about the rest of 
the vertebrates. 
 
Conscious perception and various cognitive functions in humans typically involve the 
thalamocortical complex (Seth et al. 2005). While most vertebrates don’t have this system in 
place, they still have functionally equivalent neuroanatomy. For example, birds do not 
possess an extensive cerebral cortex, but the avian pallium is structurally homologous 
(Medina & Reiner 2000). Note that this is a classic example of convergent evolution. While 
the fish brain develops a little differently during ontogeny compared with the rest of the 
vertebrates, there is mounting evidence that the same structures are present in the fish 
brain (Rodriguez et al. 2011). For example, the lateral and medial pallia in fishes are 
homologous to the tetrapod hippocampus and amygdala, respectively. Lesions to the medial 
pallia disrupt emotional heart rate (fear) conditioning and avoidance learning (Broglio et al. 
2005). The telencephalon (teleost forebrain) is also involved in avoidance learning (Overmier 
& Papini 1986; Onishi 1997) and contains the emotional system that modulates fear 
conditioning (Portavella et al. 2003). Importantly, the telencephalon receives projections 
from the thalamus that mirror those seen in mammals (Rink & Wullimann 2004) and pain-
responsive neurons are present in this structure (Dunlop & Laming 2005).  
 
Goldfish C1 and C2 fibres are functionally equivalent to mammalian C fibres including 
polymodal nociceptors; and the trigeminal nerve is dominated by C1 fibres as it is in 
mammals. It is interesting to note that C fibres have not been found in elasmobranchs, but 
structures that perform similar functions presumably exist given their presence in agnathans 
(Snow et al. 1993). Collectively, it appears that fish possess the same route for noiciceptive 
afferent information as seen in mammals all the way from the periphery to the higher CNS. 
Mounting evidence further suggests that the telencephalon is the structure most likely to be 
involved in pain perception in fishes. The teleost pallial areas are responsible for higher 
order cognitive and emotional processing, and the dorsal lateral areas in particular resemble 
the tetrapod cortex (Rodriguez et al. 2011; Demski 2013). Moreover, fishes have similar 
ascending somatosensory pathways, opioid receptors, and endogenous opioids (Sneddon 
2003, Sneddon 2004; Stoskopf 1994). 




While it is apparent that as the phylogenetic distance between animals increases, the 
number of homologous traits likely decreases, nevertheless the basic structure of neurons, 
synapses, neurotransmitters, and even patterns of connectivity resembling those of the 
human cortex remain the same (Baars 2005; Cottee 2010). One must conclude, therefore, 
that the similarities between the neuroanatomical structures involved in pain perception 
across all vertebrates far outweigh any perceived differences; this is a common signature of 
the conserved nature of the evolution of important developmental pathways (Edelman et al. 
2005). The case is the same even in the absence of convergent evolution. This is one of the 
reasons why zebrafish are routinely used to understand any number of human disorders 
ranging from drug addiction to Alzheimer’s disease (Lieschke & Currie 2007). 
 
Key is quick to dismiss behavioural evidence of pain as simply reflexive. In doing so he 
effectively writes off a hundred years of comparative psychology and behavioural ecology 
research. Entire fields of science are summarily dismissed. Behavioural research is the key to 
understanding the workings not just animal minds but our own. Much of child psychology is 
based on behavioural observations. There is ample behavioural evidence that fish show long-
term, complex behaviour where they are clearly cognitively engaged with pain (see reviews 
by Chandroo et al. 2004; Braithwaite 2010; Cottee 2012; Sneddon et al. 2014; Brown 2015). 
Half a century ago, Agranoff et al. (1965) used a standard shuttle box to examine memory 
fixation in goldfish and found that injection with puromycin disrupts memory fixation as it 
does in mice. By changing the shock intensity, Gallon (1972) showed that the avoidance 
response by goldfish changes in a manner similar to dogs. Both of these papers clearly 
illustrate that the fishes’ response to painful stimuli is not a simple reflex and is similar to 
mammals.  
 
Long-term avoidance of locations and or stimuli associated with pain also provides evidence 
of non-reflexive behaviour. Hook-avoidance/shyness in fish, for example, can be retained for 
more than a year (Beukema 1970). Similarly, the ability to trade off between conflicting 
needs, such as avoiding noxious stimuli and staying close to conspecifics for safety, shows 
clear evidence of higher order processing of pain by fishes (Dunlop & Laming 2005). Fish will 
also trade off access to food with the likelihood of receiving a shock (Millsopp & Laming 
2008). Self-medication following application of a painful stimulus by choosing a previously 
least preferred compartment that is now laced with pain killers is also firm evidence of 
cognitive engagement with painful stimuli (Sneddon 2012). Thus, although there are no 
doubts that some of the behavioural responses of fishes to noxious stimuli are reflexive (as 
they are in humans), there is a rich array of complex behaviours that illustrate cognitive 
processing of pain in higher parts of the fish brain, most notably the telencephalon 
(Rodriguiz et al. 2011; Brown 2015; Sneddon 2015). 
 
Gregory (1999) proposed three-step criteria for objectively assessing if fish feel pain. First, 
we must establish that fish possess the neural architecture that other animals use to feel 
pain. Second, we must show that the responses to painful stimuli invoke changes in 
behaviour which can then be mitigated with analgesics. The last criterion is training fish to 
avoid aversive stimuli through associative learning. Science has clearly addressed the second 
and third criteria, and I would argue there is mounting evidence for the first. Although each 
piece of evidence can be explained away individually, the large body of convergent evidence 
 Animal Sentience 2016.011:  Brown Commentary on Key on Fish Pain 
5 
 
from cross-disciplinary sources cannot be ignored. Even if we have doubts about any of 
these criteria, our fall-back position based on our understanding of evolutionary theory 
should be that fish do feel pain until proven otherwise. It just so happens that this position is 
also the most conservative one from an animal welfare perspective. Key himself concedes 
that we cannot prove that fish do not feel pain. It behoves us as human beings to treat all 
animals with respect and to minimise pain and suffering where we are able to do so. From a 
risk management perspective, the ethical costs of making an error in this judgement are 





Thanks to the many people who have partaken in active discussions in this interesting topic 
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